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Food Fight: An Appraisal of the Fruit and
Vegetable Dispute Resolution Corporation'
Tammy Smith*

INTRODUCTION
Large trucks filled with perishable goods from Canada,
Mexico, and the United States cross national borders making
deliveries to fellow NAFTA countries. Although this shipment
process is vital to the agricultural industry, adequate dispute
resolution has historically been lacking when problems arise.
Finding existing laws in Canada, the United States, and Mexico
inadequate to address these problems, a NAFTA Advisory
Committee recommended the creation of the Fruit and Vegetable Dispute Resolution Corporation (FVDRC) in Canada.
This Article examines what motivations compelled NAFTA
members to enact Article 707, a provision that mandated the
creation of the Advisory Committee on Private International
Disputes Regarding Agriculture (Advisory Committee).1 Part II
describes the circumstances in Canada that led to the FVDRC's
creation. Parts III and IV briefly recount the difficulties challenging agricultural producers in the United States and Mexico.
Parts V and VI describe the creation of the FVDRC and the
methods through which it resolves claims. Part VII analyzes
the long-term feasibility of the FVDRC and Part VIII discusses
the obstacles facing acceptance of the FVDRC in Mexico.

Copyright 2002 by Tammy Smith; Minnesota Journal of Global Trade.
* L.L.B., 2001, University of Western Ontario; Student-at-Law, Stikeman
Elliott, Ottawa. The Author would like to thank Professor Chi Carmody, Faculty of
Law at the University of Western Ontario, for his extensive suggestions and assistance in editing this Article. Further, the Author would like to thank Mr. Stephen
Whitney, CEO of the FVDRC, for his significant insight into the background and
current workings of the Fruit and Vegetable Dispute Resolution Corporation.
1.
See FVDRC, ExEcuTIvE SUMMARY, at http://www.fvdrc.com/main-e.htm
(last visited Mar. 11, 2002).
t
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I. PERISHABLE FOOD AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
NORTH AMERICA
The process by which most fresh fruits and vegetables reach
consumer tables in North America is extraordinary. Within days
of harvest, huge quantities of perishable produce 2 are loaded
onto trucks and shipped great distances to depots where they
are packaged and sold in short order.3 During this process the
produce often crosses national borders and enters new jurisdictions with different legal regimes. At the point of crossing into a
different country, the produce is subject to Customs inspection
and clearance. 4 A government agent notifies the importer of the
condition of the goods, providing the importer an opportunity to
accept or reject the produce. If accepted, the produce will continue on its way to consumer tables.
This process involves hundreds of thousands of actors, including agricultural producers, shippers, retailers, and consumers across the continent, all of whom share a stake in moving
large inventories of fruit and vegetables from field to table in
minimal time. Any delay is cause for concern. Rejection of an
international produce shipment can spell disaster for actors up
2. The Fruit and Vegetable Dispute Resolution Corporation defines "perishable agricultural commodity" as "includ[ing] all fresh and chilled fruits and vegetables, fresh cuts, edible fungi and herbs, but exclud[ing] any fresh fruit and vegetable
which is frozen or sold for seed." FVDRC, TRADING STANDARDS § 17 111(o), at
http://www.fvdrc.com/trading-e.htm (April 30, 2001).
3. See Brian Rattray, A CanadianPerspectiveon North American Agricultural
Trade Flows (1988-98), in TRADE LIBERALIZATION UNDER NAFTA: REPORT CARD ON
AGRICULTURE 64, 71, available at http://www.farmfoundation.orgsandiego/
nafta_reportLcard.pdf (2001).
Canadian imports of fruits and vegetables (excluding potatoes) from the United
States reached $2.482 billion in 1998, down from $2.579 billion in 1997 but up 76%
from $1.611 billion in 1988. Canadian exports of fruit and vegetables to the United
States reached $765 million in 1998, up 27% from $601 million in 1997, and up
296% from $193 million in 1988. Id. (citations omitted); see also ECONOMIC
RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., NAFTA: The Record to Date, AGRIC.
OUTLOOK, Sept. 1999, at 13 (reporting that U.S. trade in agricultural products with
Canada and Mexico has increased substantially since 1993).
4. Customs inspection and clearance are regulated in part by NAFTA trade
provisions for agricultural goods. These trade provisions were negotiated bilaterally, so there are separate provisions for trade between Canada and the United
States and the United States and Mexico. NAFTA incorporates the provisions of the
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement for trade between Canada and the United
States. Section B of NAFTA Annex 703.2 relates to trade between Canada and Mexico and Section A of NAFTA Annex 703.2 relates to trade between the United States
and Mexico. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 L.L.M.
605 [hereinafter NAFTA].
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and down the chain of transfer, something opportunistic importers might seek to exploit. The time-sensitive nature of the fresh
produce industry increases the possibility of rapid financial loss;
consequently, there is a need for speedy and effective dispute
resolution.

II.

A.

THE CANADIAN SYSTEM OF AGRICULTURAL
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A TROUBLED PAST
AND THE NEED FOR A SOLUTION

REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL AND INTER-PROVINCIAL

TRADE

Canada's legislative powers are divided between the federal
government and the provinces.5 Since confederation in 1867,
the federal government has maintained primary authority over
regulation of trade and commerce. 6 This includes the regulation
of international and inter-provincial trade.7 The individual provincial governments, however, control intra-provincial trade,
provided that the regulation does not significantly infringe upon
8
a valid federal power.
The Supreme Court of Canada explained the ambit of this
provincial control over intra-provincial trade and commerce in
Reference Respecting the Farm Products Marketing Act. 9 In a
later decision the Court summarized the principles of the Reference Respecting the Farm Products Marketing Act. 10

5. Those powers enumerated in section 91 of the Constitution fall under the
exclusive authority of the federal government, while those powers enumerated in
section 92 fall under the exclusive authority of the provincial governments. See
CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1867) pt. VI (Distribution of Legislative Powers), §§
91-92. Nuances in each of these sections are beyond the scope of this Article.
6. See id. § 91(2).
7. See Citizens Ins. Co. v. Parsons, [1881] 7 App. Cas. 96 (Can.). The Privy
Council stated that the federal trade and commerce power included the "regulation
of trade in matters of intraprovincial concern." Id. at 113; see also Attorney-General
for Manitoba v. Manitoba Egg & Poultry Assoc., [1971 S.C.R. 689, 709 (Can.)
(Laskin, J.) ("It has been put beyond doubt that Parliament's power under s.91(2) is
exclusive so far as concerns the prohibition or regulation of exports to and imports
from other countries, and that a province may not, as legislator, prohibit or regulate
the export of goods therefrom.").
8. See R. v. Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401 (Can.).
9. See Ref. Respecting the Farm Prod. Mktg. Act, [19571 S.C.R. 198 (Can.).
10. See Manitoba Egg & Poultry Assoc., [1971] S.C.R. at 709 (Can.).
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"[R]egulation of the marketing, or the processing and marketing
of products in a province for consumption therein is within provincial competence." 1 However, the scope of the individual
provinces' power does not extend to "regulation of the marketing
of provincial produce intended for export or sought to be purchased for export ....,u2
The principles set out in the Reference Respecting the Farm
Products Marketing Act made it clear that provincial governments have the power to legislate with respect to contractual relations and marketing of goods produced and consumed within
their province. 13 Therefore, the holding in the Reference Respecting the Farm Products Marketing Act raised the possibility
that a federal regulation impinging on protected intra-provincial
contractual relations might be reach beyond the constitutionally
permissible scope of federal power.
B.

THE CANADA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS STANDARDS ACT

In 1955, the Canadian federal government promulgated
uniform agricultural product production, marketing, and selling
standards with the passage of the Canada Agricultural Products
Standards Act [CAP Act]. 14 The CAP Act regulated a wide
spectrum of the Canadian agricultural industry, from inspection
to disposal. The CAP Act regulated grading, marking, inspec-

tion, and fees associated with the industry. 5 The legislation

also sought to regulate importation and exportation both interprovincially and internationally. 6 Agricultural dealers were required to obtain licenses in accordance with the CAP Act. 7 In

addition to these provisions, section eight of the CAP Act provided general authority to issue regulations necessary to carry
11. Id. at 713.
12. Id.
13. See Reference Respecting the Farm Products Marketing Act, [1957] S.C.R.
at 269, 292, 312; see also Citizens Ins. Co., [1881] 7 App. Cas. at 96 FN 56 (discussing the relationship between interprovincial trade and the federal trade and commerce power).
14.
Canadian Agricultural Products Standards Act, R.S.C., ch. A-8 (1970)
(Can.). The CAP Act contained specific provisions authorizing certain types of regulations regarding agricultural products, including grading, importation and transportation, seizing of and disposing, and licensing of dealers and importers. Under
the CAP Act, members of the agricultural industry had to be licensed. A license
could be revoked for various reasons, including failure to comply with a Board of Arbitration decision or regulations promulgated under the CAP Act.
15. See id. § 3.
16. See id. § 5.
17. See id. § 6.

2002]

FOODFIGHT

289

out the purposes and administration of the Act.' 8
The broad authority the CAP Act allowed respecting the
promulgation of administrative regulations raised the familiar
question of the permissible limits of legislative delegation. 19
This issue arose because federal authorities found it necessary
to form a standing Board of Arbitration in order to resolve disputes arising out of the extensive scheme of agricultural regulation and licensing set out in the CAP Act. The Board of Arbitration was a quasi-judicial body that heard disagreements
between CAP Act licensees who 20failed to comply with regulations promulgated under the Act.
18. See id. § 8. "The Governor in Council may make regulations for carrying out
the purposes and provisions of this Act and for prescribing anything that by this Act
is required to be prescribed." Id.
19. In Canada (A.G.) v. Ontario (A.G.), [1937] D.L.R. 673, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council noted that federal and provincial powers in Canada's Constitution were mutually exclusive. Lord Atkin noted that the powers enunciated in
Canada's Constitution were "water-tight compartments which are an essential part
of her original structure." Id. at 684. However, as Patrick J. Monahan notes, "[t]his
restrictive approach significantly limits the extent to which Parliament can effectively regulate trade (even purely interprovincial and international trade), since effective regulation often requires controls over the entire production and marketing
of a product." P.J. MONAHAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 47 (1997). Monahan later notes
that "it might have been thought that it should be open to Parliament to regulate
local trade when such regulation was necessary or inextricably bound up with a
regulatory scheme whose primary purpose... was the regulation of interprovincial
and international trade. . . . This is the position in the United States, where Congress has authority to regulate local trade where such regulation is an 'appropriate
means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execution of the granted
power to regulate interstate commerce.'" Id. at 51 (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942)). In a series of decisions in the early 1980s
the Supreme Court of Canada altered the "watertight compartments" approach to be
more in keeping with that of the U.S. approach. In R. v. Zellerbach Canada Ltd,
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 401 (Can.), the Court set down the factors that the federal
government must meet for a legislative enactment to meet the "National Concern"
test. This approach also appears to follow the Court's pronouncement in Manitoba
Egg & Poultry Assoc., [1971] S.C.R. at 709 (Can.), where the Court held that the
provinces could not legislate in such a way as to impede the free flow of goods. In
1972 the provinces, in a federally-arranged scheme, were able to implement those
provisions related to intraprovincial trade.
20. See Canada Agricultural Products Standards Act, Product Licensing Regulations, P.C. 1967-2265, SOR167-605 § 20(1) (Regulations). Disagreements could be
heard with respect to licensees who (1) misrepresented the type of license issued to
them; (2) failed to maintain accurate records; (3) failed to allow examination of their
records; (4) failed to forward the proceeds from the sale of produce belonging to another; (5) destroyed or discarded more than five percent of any lot of produce belonging to another without evidence the produce had no commercial value; (6) acted
fraudulently under their license; (7) failed to account for a transaction; or (8) failed
to deliver contracted produce without reasonable cause. See id. According to this
subsection a complaint could also be made with regards to licensees who failed to
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It is important to note that the CAP Act itself did not contain provisions establishing the Board of Arbitration. Instead,
the Board of Arbitration was created under the broad authority
the CAP Act allowed through the issuance of administrative
regulations. 2 ' The gap between the broad range of regulatory
authority allowed under the CAP Act and limits on permissible
legislative delegation under the Constitution laid the foundation
for the Steve Dart Company's application for a writ of prohibition 22 against the Board of Arbitration in 1974.
C. STEVE DART CO. V. CANADA

After receiving a shipment of corn from a U.S. dealer, the
Steve Dart Company advised the shipper that due to the poor
quality of the product they were requesting that Canada's Department of Agriculture inspect the goods. 23 The corn was inspected and subsequently the shipper filed a formal complaint24
with the Department of Agriculture claiming non-payment.
The Board of Arbitration advised the Steve Dart Company that
it had to pay the shipper's claim or file a notice contesting the
claim. 25 Instead, the Steve Dart Company applied for a writ of
prohibition, asserting
that the Regulations issued pursuant to the [CAP Act], insofar as they
[purported] to set up the [Board of Arbitration] and to provide for its
composition, for the granting to it of judicial or quasi-judicial powers
and... for the making by it of findings as to issues of liability arising
between individual parties and for the enforcement of such findings,
are ultra vires in that the [CAP
Act] does not provide authority for any
26
such Regulations to be made.

The Federal Court Trial Division noted the divergence between the CAP Act and the Regulations regarding the formation
of a Board of Arbitration. It held that there was an absence of

comply with sections thirteen to sixteen of the Regulations.
21.
See id. § 31.
22.
"Prohibition" is "[an extraordinary writ issued by an appellate court to
prevent a lower court from exceeding its jurisdiction or to prevent a nonjudicial offi-

cer or entity from exercising a power."

BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY

1212 (7th ed.

1999).
23.
Steve Dart Co. & D.J. Duer & Co., [1974] 46 D.L.R. (3d) 745, 747.
24.
Id. The Court only briefly discusses the inspection by the Department of
Agriculture. The Court makes no mention of the findings of the Department; instead, it focuses on the decision by the Steve Dart Company to apply for a writ of
prohibition instead of contesting the shipper's claim or making payment. See id.
25.
Id.
26.
Id.
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statutory authority for the formation of the Board of Arbitration
27
and the writ of prohibition should issue for that reason alone.
The court noted that the Regulations, by establishing the Board
of Arbitration, set out a procedure to "try the merits of any complaint," to "grant awards of damages arising out of such claims,"
and to "enforce the awards by means of an automatic forfeiture
of license in the event of non-compliance with an award." 28 The
Court reasoned that there was no statutory authority for such
an adjudicatory body under the CAP Act, stating "exercise of a
power to revoke a license in order to enforce a finding as to a
claim between individuals which the [Board of Arbitration] has
no statutory power to make is an abusive and illegal use of such
power. "29
The Steve Dart Co. decision removed the Board of Arbitration's enforcement power and its ability to effectively regulate
agricultural disputes ceased. 30 Any Board of Arbitration findings subsequent to Steve Dart Co. could be ignored by the
wrongdoer, leaving the court system as the only effective avenue
for enforcement. The Canadian government made various legislative attempts to fill the adjudicative vacuum left in the wake
of the decision, but all attempts failed.3 1 Even if the legislative
attempts had come to fruition, it is very likely that they also
would have been unsuccessful in establishing a lasting mechanism for expedited adjudication of agricultural disputes in Canada. The rationale for the futility of a purely legislative solution
is found in the closing comments of Steve Dart Co. There, in
dicta, the court stated

27. Id. at 749 (noting that the Court "has a power to grant such relief against a
body which, although not legally constituted, purports to be and to act and exercise
powers as a federal board or tribunal pursuant to federal Regulations and a federal

Act").
28. Id. at 751.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Subsequent to the decision in Steve Dart Co., the Board of Arbitration continued to exist, albeit with a significantly curtailed jurisdiction. The Licensing and
Arbitration Regulations, promulgated subsequent to Steve Dart Co., do not provide
that the failure to comply with the Regulations is grounds for cancellation of one's
license.
31. Following Steve Dart Co., it appeared that the only thing that remained to
be done was to seek agreement with the provinces, given that any Board of Arbitration's power would deal with a matter of provincial competence. Because contractual
relations are substantially a matter coming under provincial authority, the provinces would have to collaborate with the federal government and all of the other
provinces such that national legislation could be enacted. See also Reference Respecting the Farm Products Marketing Act, [1957] S.C.R. at 312.
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[e]ven if all of the provisions contained in the Regulations were actually embodied in the [CAP Act], it might possibly still be argued successfully, having regard to the fact that such extensive powers in a
board of arbitration would not really be required to properly administer the provisions of the [CAP Act], that the purported granting of such
powers might constitute an infringement of the property and civil
rights provisions contained in s. 92 of the [ConstitutionAct 18671 .32

Thus, in addition to the question of valid legislative delegation under the CAP Act, there existed further concerns as to
whether the federal government possessed the power to legislate
such a broad agricultural adjudicative and licensing scheme
without encroaching upon provincial privileges under the Constitution. The rationale used in the Steve Dart Co. decision
strongly suggests that had the federal government correctly and
completely promulgated the regulations that established the
Board of Arbitration, those regulations would have encroached
on constitutionally protected provincial powers.3 3
D. POST-STEVE DART

Co.: THE NEED FOR A SOLUTION

Following Steve Dart Co., the judicial system was the only
remaining Canadian mechanism for enforcement of intraprovincial or international contractual disputes in the agricultural industry. Unfortunately, the sale of fruits and vegetables
does not lend itself to full-scale litigation due to the small
amount of money typically at issue and the perishable nature of
the product. 34 Although an injured party might ultimately receive a favorable judgment from a court, costs stemming from
the action could easily outstrip the recovery. Consequently, after the Steve Dart Co. decision many produce disputes in Can35
ada went unresolved.
Although individual produce shipments are small, fruits
and vegetables comprise the largest portion of agricultural trade
32.

Steve Dart Co. & D.J. Duer & Co., [1974] 46 D.L.R. (3d) 745, 751.

33.
See R. DYCK, CANADIAN POLITICS: CRITICAL APPROACHES 69-91 (1996); R.
Gibbons, Federalism and Regional Alienation, in CHALLENGES TO CANADIAN
FEDERALISM (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall 1998); P.H. RUSSELL, CONSTITUTIONAL
ODYSSEY: CAN CANADIANS BECOME A SOVEREIGN PEOPLE? 34-52 (1993). Because

both the federal and the provincial governments jealously guard their respective areas of authority, federal-provincial cooperation would be required in this area. It is
unlikely that the federal government could gain the agreement of each of the provinces on these issues as each provincial jurisdiction would have its own agenda.
34. The Steve Dart Co. dispute is one example of this, as the amount at issue
was $3992.10. Steve Dart Co. & D.J. Duer & Co., [1974] 46 D.L.R. (3d) 745, 746.
35. Telephone Interview with Stephen Whitney, President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Fruit and Vegetable Dispute Resolution Corporation, (Mar. 2, 2001).
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between the United States and Canada. 36 Thus, after Steve
Dart Co. the Canadian produce industry was thrust into a difficult position. The Board of Arbitration had been rendered ineffectual. Aggrieved parties had no choice but turn to the judicial
system for a costly and inefficient remedy. Ever-increasing levels of continental agricultural trade, coupled with the significant
deterioration in private commercial relations, provided the impetus for Canada's support
of NAFTA Article 707, designed to
37
address this problem.

III.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE PERISHABLE
AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES ACT

The United States enacted the Perishable Agricultural
Commodities Act (PACA) 38 in 1930 with a mandate to promote
fair and ethical trading practices in the fruit and vegetable industry. 39 With few exceptions, U.S. law requires buyers and
40
sellers trading in fruits and vegetables have PACA licenses.
These licenses can be revoked if the licensee is found to be in41
volved in unfair trading practices.
The PACA primarily addresses disputes within the United

36. See Rattray, supra note 3, at 71-72; see also "NAFTA: The Record to Date,"
supra note 3, at 14-15.
37. It is worth noting that the Canada-United States: Free-Trade Agreement,
Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 281 [hereinafter CUSFTA] did not contain a provision similar to Article 707. The CUSFTA was also negotiated after the Steve Dart
Co. decision, essentially in the midst of deteriorating national and international private commercial relationships. It may be that because the CUSFTA was an agreement negotiated by governments to effect freer trade practices on the part of governments, an extension into private commercial relationships was not considered as
an option until NAFTA.
38. Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. § 499 (2002).
39. See Brenda Branaman, The Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act
(PACA), at http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/Agriculture/ag-85.cfm (last visited
Feb. 12, 2001).
40. 7 U.S.C. 499C(a).
41. See 7 U.S.C. § 499H(B)(2). Pursuant to § 499b of the PACA, unfair trade
practices include rejecting, without reasonable cause, produce bought or contracted
to be handled on consignment, § 499B(2), failure to promptly pay the agreed price of
produce that complies with contract terms, discarding, dumping or destroying without reasonable cause any produce received to be sold on behalf of another firm, §
499B(3), the failure or refusal to account truly and correctly or to make full payment
promptly for produce shipped on consignment, § 499B(1) or on joint account and
misbranding or misrepresentation of grade, quality, quantity, weight, state or country of origin of fruits and vegetables, § 499B(5).
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States among its own traders.4 2 The PACA is also available to
Canadian and Mexican exporters to resolve disputes with U.S.
importers as well. 43 However, the scope of the PACA is limited

and it is of little benefit to U.S. exporters involved in disputes
with Canadian or Mexican importers. 44 Under the PACA, few
options are open to a U.S. exporter involved in such a dispute
beyond voluntary negotiation or seeking recourse in Canadian
45
or Mexican courts.

It was the PACA's jurisdictional powerlessness and the concurrent inability of the Canadian and Mexican judicial systems
to adequately address disputes involving U.S. exporters and
Canadian and Mexican importers that created the impetus for a
more secure produce trading environment in North America.
The opportunity to establish a secure continental marketplace
developed with the initiation of talks aimed at the creation of a
North American free trade zone encompassing Canada, the
United States and Mexico. 46 During these negotiations, the agricultural industry of the United States lobbied for the creation
of NAFTA Article 707 with the expectation that the resultant
bridge the
Advisory Committee would find a way to effectively
47
existing jurisdictional gaps that had developed.
IV.

MEXICO'S UNDERDEVELOPED DISPUTE
RESOLUTION SYSTEM

Prior to NAFTA, adjudication of produce disputes in Mexico, as in Canada, relied heavily on the judicial system. There is
no Mexican equivalent to the CAP Act or the PACA, designed to
expedite perishable produce dispute settlement. 48 As an exporter of great importance to its southern neighbor, the United
to create a more regular,
States in particular wanted Mexico
49
formal and transparent system.
42. See Questions and Answers, at http://www.fvdrc.conqa-e.htm (last visited
Mar. 10, 2002).
43. See id.
44. See id.
at http:!
Packer Article-Organization,
McCarron,
45. See Stephen
www.mccarronlaw.com (last visited Feb. 11, 2002) [hereinafter McCarron].
46.

See J.R. JOHNSON, ESSENTALS OF CANADIAN LAW: INTERNATIONAL TRADE

LAW 31 (1998).
47. See Whitney, supra note 35.
48. See McCarron, supra note 45.
49. Technology Trade and Commerce Agency,
www.commerce.ca.gov (last visited Mar. 10, 2002).

Agriculture,

at

http:ll
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Since NAFTA took force in early 1994, Mexico has made
significant strides in increasing the consistency of its agricultural import system.5 0 Nevertheless, the desired degree of consistency has not always been achieved and, as of the time of this
writing, Mexico has yet to introduce PACA-style legislation.
V. THE BIRTH OF THE FVDRC
A. ESTABLISHING AN ADVISORY COMMITTEE
During NAFTA negotiations only the United States had a
viable system of expedited dispute resolution for perishable produce. 51 The Canadian system did not efficiently address domestic or international disputes in the produce industry. 52 Mexico
53
similarly lacked a system to address agricultural disputes.
This dearth of viable dispute resolution mechanisms culminated
in the creation of the Fruit and Vegetable Dispute Resolution
Corporation (FVDRC). Established in May 2000 and headquartered in Ottawa, Canada, the FVDRC is a private, non-profit or54
ganization of produce companies trading in North America.
Its mission is to provide the North American produce industry
with the policies, standards, and services necessary to resolve
55
disputes in a timely and cost-effective manner.
The FVDRC is derived from Articles 2022 and 707 of
NAFTA. Article 2022 commits the treaty's signatories to promote, to the best of their abilities, expeditious means of dispute
settlement among private commercial parties in their jurisdictions. 56 This broad obligation is particularized within the agricultural field by NAFTA Article 707, which provides that
[tihe Committee [on Agricultural Trade, established in Article 706]
shall establish an Advisory Committee on Private Commercial Disputes regarding Agricultural Goods, comprising persons with expertise
or experience in the resolution of private commercial disputes in agricultural trade. The Advisory Committee shall report and provide recommendations to the Committee for the development of systems in the
50. Technology Trade and Commerce Agency, Case Study-Agriculture, at
http://www.commerce.ca.gov (last visited Mar. 10, 2002).
51. See discussion supra Part III; see also PACA 7 U.S.C. § 499.
52. See discussion supra Part II.
53. See discussion supra Part LV.
54. See FVDRC, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, at http://www.fvdrc.com/main-e.htm
(last visited Mar. 10, 2002).
55.

Id.

56.

NAFTA, at art. 2022(1).
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territory of each Party to achieve the prompt and effective resolution of
such disputes, taking into account any special57circumstance, including
the perishability of certain agricultural goods.

Thus, Article 707 mandated the creation of the Advisory
Committee on Private International Disputes Regarding Agriculture (Advisory Committee) to address discrepancies in the
Canadian, United States and Mexican systems of dispute resolution arising from private commercial transactions in fruits
and vegetables. 58 The Advisory Committee was to generate recommendations for the development of territorial dispute resolution mechanisms with respect to the perishable produce industry. 59 The Advisory Committee, comprised of members from
both industry and government from each of the three NAFTA
countries, first met in February 1997.60
PHASE ONE OF ARTICLE 707 IMPLEMENTATION:
IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS

B.

Initially the Advisory Committee divided the process of creating a common adjudicatory mechanism into two phases. In
the first phase the Advisory Committee identified industry requirements and objectives for expedited produce dispute resolution; implementation of the system was left to the second
was
phase. 6 1 The first phase of the Advisory Committee's plan
62
Reference.
of
Terms
of
promulgation
the
with
completed
According to the Terms of Reference, the main issue facing
the Advisory Committee was to identify, facilitate, promote and
utilize alternative dispute resolution methods, specifically arbitration.6 The Advisory Committee identified the fruit and vegetable industry as one that would particularly benefit from the
57.

Id. at art. 707 (emphasis added).

58.

Id.

59. Article 2022 also provides for the establishment of an Advisory Committee
on Private Commercial Disputes. The Advisory Committee on Private Commercial
Disputes in Agriculture was to report to the committee set up pursuant to Article
2022. Analysis of the Article 2022 Committee is beyond the scope of this Article.
60. The Advisory Committee first met in Mazatlan, Mexico, from February 1618 1997. Their second and final meeting occurred in Anaheim, California, October
21-22 1997.
61. Advisory Committee on Private Commercial Disputes Regarding Agricultural Goods, USDA, Backgrounder to Terms of Reference, April 30 1996, provided by
S. Whitney [hereinafter Backgrounder] (on file with author).
62. Advisory Committee on Private Commercial Disputes Regarding Agricultural Goods, USDA, Terms of Reference, April 30 1996, provided by S. Whitney (on
file with author).
63. See id.
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use of arbitration.64 Arbitration offers several advantages over
litigation for the produce industry because it is generally
cheaper and expeditious when compared to formal adjudicative
65
proceedings.
From its inception, the Advisory Committee envisioned that
its recommendations would be consistent with the original
NAFTA mandate and objectives. 66 As such, the Advisory Committee's recommendations were not designed to mirror judicial
or adjudicatory systems already in place. 67 Instead, a dispute
resolution mechanism focusing on arbitration was created to
complement them. 68 "[Kley elements [included] the formation of
an organization operated and supported by industry, and the
maintenance of a list of participating firms which trade across
69
borders within the free trade area."
The Advisory Committee focused on developing an efficient
mechanism to address the existing gaps in the resolution of private contractual produce disputes. 70 As one member of the Advisory Committee noted, the central idea behind the mechanism
was to ensure the parties to a transaction get paid. 71 To this
end, the Advisory Committee recommended the creation of a
corporate entity known as the Fruit and Vegetable Dispute
72
Resolution Corporation.
The heavy governmental regulation that already exists in
the agricultural industry makes an independent corporation an
unlikely ideal international dispute resolution mechanism.

64. See Press Release, USDA Agricultural Marketing Service, NAFTA Commercial
Disputes Advisory
Committee
Makes
Progress,
available at
http://151.121.3.15I/news (Mar. 24, 1997).
65. See A.J. PIRIE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: SKILLS, SCIENCE, AND
THE LAW 87 (2000).
66. See Backgrounder, supra note 61.
67. This would include systems such as the PACA (discussed above), the Blue
Book, and the Red Book. The Blue Book is a service providing credit and marketing
information regarding firms in the produce industry, including growers, suppliers
and transportation businesses. Similarly, the Red Book is a credit-reporting agency
for the produce industry. The Blue Book provides information about businesses in
Canada, the United States, and Mexico, whereas the Red Book provides information
about international businesses.
68. See Press Release, USDA, NAFTA Agricultural Advisory Committee Recommends Tri-National Private Commercial Dispute Resolution System, available at
http://www.usda.gov/news (Oct. 29, 1997).
69. Id.
70. See Backgrounder, supra note 61.
71.
See Whitney, supra note 35.
72.
See Press Release, Conflict Resolution Network Canada, New ADR Body
Fills Dual Role, available at http://www.crnetwork.ca/news (July 25, 2000).
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However, the voluntary organization taking a corporate form
appears to have been the most effective instrument available to
address all types of disputes, particularly in light of the Canadian federal government's inability to regulate both interna73
tional and intra-provincial disputes.
VI.
A.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE FVDRC

CORPORATE STRUCTURE

The FVDRC was incorporated October 7, 2000 as a nonprofit 74 corporation with a paid membership under the Canada
Business Corporations Act. 75 The FVDRC defines its mission as
"deal[ing] with all types of disputes including condition, contract
and payment issues.... [and providing] the North American

produce industry with the trinational policies, standards and
services necessary for resolving disputes in a timely and cost effective manner."76 The goods covered includes "all fresh and

chilled fruits and vegetables, fresh cuts, edible fungi and herbs,
but excludes any fresh fruit and vegetable which is frozen or
sold for seed." 77 The Board of Directors, currently comprised of
leading figures from the produce industry who were heavily involved in the creation of the entity, oversee the operation of the
FVDRC. The appointment of the Board of Directors was undertaken in this way to provide continuity between the process of
creating and the process of overseeing the FVDRC. Pursuant to
the FVDRC Membership Bylaws, a new Board of Directors will

be elected from the FVDRC membership after two years of op-

73. Id.
74. See Tri-National Dispute Resolution Mechanism for Horticulture,
ADAPTATION UPDATE (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada), Nov./Dec. 1998, available
at http://www.agr.ca/policy/adapt/adaptation-update.
Initially the Canadian government provided a one-time cash infusion to the FVDRC of $873,000 over three
years (1998-2000) through the Canadian Adaptation and Rural Development Fund.
See id. The funds were provided to ensure that the Canadian Horticultural Council
and Canadian Produce Marketing Association could assist in the development of an
improved dispute resolution mechanism pursuant to NAFTA Article 707. However,
according to Mr. Stephen Whitney, President and CEO of the FVDRC, the corporation currently operates exclusively on funds derived from annual membership fees.
Whitney supra note 35.
75. See Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., ch. 44 (1985) (Can.).
76. FVDRC Homepage, Fruit and Vegetable Dispute Resolution Corporation, at
http://www.fvdrc.com/b-text-e.htm (last visited January 30, 2002)
77. Id.
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eration. 8
In Canada, the transition from the CAP Act licensing
scheme to the FVDRC is designed to be both smooth and voluntary. Currently, the FVRDC is operating under a two-year
phase-in period. The mandatory licensing system 79 promulgated
by the CAP Act will be totally deregulated in 2003. This twoyear phase-in period enables current Canadian license holders
to voluntarily migrate to the industry-run FVDRC, while
simultaneously maintaining familiar regulatory services. Only
those dealers opting to retain their old licenses will be governed
by the existing Regulations, with those opting to join the
FVDRC being subject to its dispute settlement rules.8 0

78. See id.; see also Membership By-Laws, Fruit and Vegetable Dispute Resolution Corporation, at http://www.fvdrc.com/main-e.htm (last visited Mar 10, 2002).
79. See, Canada Agricultural Products Standards Act, Licensing and Arbitration Regulations, C.R.C., ch. 292 (1978), revoked by S.O.R./84-432 (Gaz. 13.6.84, at
2642) (1984) (Can.). These regulations were promulgated under the CAP Act. In
essence they replaced the Produce Licensing Regulations. According to both the
CAP Act and the Licensing and Arbitration Regulations, every dealer engaged in
inter-provincial and/or international trade of fruits and vegetables must have a produce dealer license from the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, subject to minor exemptions. Interestingly, under the new FVDRC regime membership is voluntary
and licensing is not a requirement to trade inter-provincially and/or internationally
in fruits and vegetables.
The Licensing and Arbitration Regulations are set up similarly to the Produce Licensing Regulations. Because of the ultra vires nature of the Produce Licensing Regulations the Licensing and Arbitration Program is unable "to deal effectively
with the non-payment of invoices between buyers and sellers, the inability of the
Board of Arbitration to deal with disputes between buyers and sellers involving elements of contract law, and the inability to extend coverage to dealers engaged in intra-provincial trade." Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, Canadian Food Inspection Agency Homepage, at http://www.cfia-acia.agr.ca/english/reg/consultation/
99019ria_e.shtml (last visited Mar. 10, 2002).
80. See Press Release, supra note 72. According to the dispute resolution announcement in ONTARIo FARMER, as of summer 2000 the FVDRC had 564 member
companies, with 405 being Canadian, 6 Mexican, and the balance from the United
States, primarily from California. Further, in a telephone conversation with Mr.
Stephen Whitney, he stated that as of the end of 2000 the FVDRC had captured 66%
of all Canadian licensees. It is his belief that the balance would join in 2001. See
Whitney, supra note 35.
There is some concern that not all of the current licensees will opt into the
new system. It may be that some of the larger, or even some of the medium or
smaller organizations, will not participate in the voluntary system. If this were to
happen it could destabilize the entire process. However, an examination of the consequences if current licensees choose not to opt into the new system is beyond the
scope of this Article.
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MEMBERSHIP

Membership in the FVDRC is open to any grower, buyer, or
seller of produce in the United States, Mexico and Canada. "In
Canada and Mexico, it is expected that all traders would want to
join because the DRC offers a valuable service not available
anywhere else."8 1 The FVDRC will also be of particular value to
U.S. exporters who, as discussed above, cannot seek redress under the PACA when doing business abroad.
C.

A MANDATORY DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSE

To ensure compliance with the FVDRC mandate, members
must enter into a binding contract with the organization. This
contractual relationship requires members to adhere to the Mediation and Arbitration Rules of the Dispute Resolution Corporation (FVDRC Rules). The FVDRC Rules require that regular
members
agree that any dispute, controversy or claim with a regular or an associate member, arising out of or in connection with any transaction involving fresh fruits and vegetables as defined in the by-laws of the
Corporation shall be resolved exclusively in accordance with these
Rules ... 82

The FVDRC Rules put in place a mandatory mechanism for
the resolution of disputes between members of the FVDRC.
They can only be circumvented when membership differences,
the nature of relief sought, or pre-existing legislation permit.
The FVDRC Rules apply to "any dispute, controversy or claim
between a member and one or more non-members where the
parties agree in writing to their application."8 3 Members may
seek recourse in court when the dispute arises with a nonmember who has not agreed to application of the FVDRC
Rules.84 Court action is also permitted when a member is seekto preing interim relief. Interim injunctive relief can be used
85
vent dissipation of assets covered by the PACA trust.
81. McCarron, supra note 45. Certainly the United States PACA provides a
similar service, but that service is only available for disputes where the importer is
from the United States. Even then the legislation is of no value to an United States
exporter in a dispute with a Canadian or Mexican importer. As such, the FVDRC
fills a void that may have hindered U.S. traders in the past.
82. Rules, art. 2.3 [emphasis added].
83. Id. art. 3.1.
84. See id. art. 2.5.
85. See id. art. 2.4. The PACA trust is a mechanism that creates a "statutory
trust consisting of a buyer's produce-related assets which are to be held for the bene-
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D. THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS
1. The Six Stages of Dispute Resolution under the FVDRC
The FVDRC Rules went into force on October 29, 2000.86
They provide for a six stage, graduated process of dispute resolution. Initially, the parties are educated by the FVDRC with
respect to their rights, remedies and obligations.8 7 From there
the disputants may engage in unassisted negotiations and problem solving.88

Assistance, advice, case analysis, information,

and counseling are available at the third stage. 89 During these
initial stages, the parties are at liberty to determine the pace of
the process. 90
If the dispute continues to escalate, a party may trigger an
informal mediation mechanism by filing a Notice of Dispute. 9 1
The Notice must be filed within nine months of when the claim
arose or when the claimant should reasonably have known of its
existence. 92 At this point, all parties must forward supporting
documentation to the FVDRC for the purpose of informal consultations. 93 If informal mediation fails to solve the problem

within twenty-one days of filing the Notice of Dispute, the claim
is moved into either the formal mediation process for claims of
$15,000 or more or into expedited arbitration for claims of

$15,000 or less. 94 It is important to note that the procedural

rules for settlement of disputes under the FVDRC vary significantly between formal mediation ($15,000 or more) and expefit of unpaid produce suppliers that have preserved their trust rights." Id. If a
business fails, the trust assets, belonging to the beneficiaries, are unavailable for
distribution to other creditors.
86. See Rules, art 1.
87. See Fruit& Vegetable Dispute Resolution Corporation ProceduresManual:
DRC Dispute Resolution System, Fruit and Vegetable Dispute Resolution Corporation, at http'//www.fvdrc.com/procedures-manual-e.htm, § 4 (last visited Mar. 10,
2002) [hereinafter ProceduresManual].
88. See id. § 5.
89. See id. § 6.
90. The Procedures Manual and the Rules detail timelines for disputes that
have proceeded to and past the informal mediation stage. However, there are no
specific timelines that must be met prior to the informal mediation stage.
91. The Notice of Dispute must contain the names of the parties involved,
counsel, if any, addresses for service, and a statement of the facts and the remedies
sought. After receiving the Notice, the respondent has seven days to reply and submit any counterclaims. See id. § 6.
92. See Rules art. 4.1.
93. See id. art 9.1.
94. See Rules art.15.1, 15.2.
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dited arbitration ($15,000 or less). However, if the parties agree,
they may use the FVDRC rules of expedited arbitration for any
95
dispute.
The FVDRC's formal mediation process is governed by the
Commercial Arbitration and Mediation Center for the Americas
Mediation and Arbitration Rules (CAMCA Rules). 96 These rules
establish a more formal process than the FVDRC Rules for larger disputes. The Commercial Arbitration and Mediation Center for the Americas is an organization dedicated to resolving
97
disputes that have escalated to the formal mediation stage.
Both the FVDRC Rules 98 and CAMCA Rules9 9 have timelines
guiding the stages of mediation and arbitration, although the
timelines are less rigid under the CAMCA Rules.
In expedited arbitration, an independent third party immediately determines a binding settlement. 10 0 The timeframe for
resolution in expedited arbitration ranges from 91 to 122 days
depending on whether the respondent has submitted a counterclaim. 10 1 The formal mediation process requires an assigned
mediator to facilitate a voluntary settlement between the parties. 0 2 If the formal mediation process fails to reach a voluntary
settlement, the disputants proceed to a more formal arbitration
process in which a third party determines a binding settlement.103

2. Selection of Arbitrators
Both the FVDRC Rules and the CAMCA Rules have similar
provisions for the selection of arbitrators. The FVDRC Rules
95. Id. art. 35.1
96. Id.
97. See Rules art. 14, 35.
98. See CAMCA Rules, Fruit and Vegetable Dispute Resolution Corporation, at
http://www.fvdrc.com/m-text-e.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2002).
99. See id. art. 14 (vaguely explaining process for terminating mediation and
moving on to arbitration).
100. Article 19 of the Rules provides for the appointment of the arbitrator. The
FVDRC is to "establish and maintain a multinational panel of arbitrators experienced in resolving produce disputes." Rules, art 19.1. Article 19.2 further provides
that "[if the parties are unable to agree to the selection of a particular arbitrator,]
the Corporation shall.. .appoint an arbitrator from its panel of arbitrators." Rules,
art. 19.2. If the FVDRC is required to appoint an arbitrator, they must "disclose the
identity of the arbitrator to the parties and provide the parties with a summary of
the arbitrator's qualifications and biographical data." Rules, art. 19.3.
101. See ProceduresManual, supra note 87, § 5b.
102. See id. § 5a.
103. See Rules, art. 13.1, 13.2.
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provide that "[u]nless the parties have agreed to the selection of
a particular arbitrator, the Corporation shall, within five (5)
days of receipt of the Statement of Claim, appoint an arbitrator
from its panel of arbitrators.' 1

°4

Similarly, the CAMCA Rules

allow the parties to mutually agree on the appointment of an
arbitrator or method of appointment. However, if the parties do
not mutually agree on an arbitrator or a method of appointment,
the CAMCA Rules require the parties use an identical list of
persons chosen from the multi-national CAMCA panel. The
parties use this list to strike objectionable arbitrators and preferentially rank acceptable arbitrators.'0 5 If the parties continue
to disagree regarding the arbitrator, the CAMCA arbitration
administrator has the power to appoint an arbitrator without
submission of additional lists.106
E.

LOCATION

Location of the arbitration proceeding is also covered by the
FVDRC Rules and the CAMCA Rules. Under Article 23.1 of the
FVDRC Rules the place of arbitration under the expedited arbitration process is "the principal office of the Corporation" in Ottawa, Canada, unless the parties agree otherwise. 10 7 According
to the CAMCA Rules, the place of arbitration should be desig0 8 If
nated in the contract or agreed to in writing by the parties.
there is no designation or agreement, the party commencing the
arbitration shall notify the administrator of its desired place of
arbitration. 10 9 Both parties are then given a period of twenty
days to submit arguments regarding the place of arbitration to a
neutral locale committee. 1 0

104. Rules, art. 19.2. Fruit and Vegetable Dispute Resolution Corporation,
Press Release,
Multinational Panel of Mediators and Arbitrators at
http://www.fvdrc.com/pr-oct26-med-arb-e.htm (October 26, 2000). In the press release, the roster of individuals approved to mediate and arbitrate disputes consists
of thirteen individuals and one corporation. The United States corporation, Produce
Reporter Company, has maintained a three-person Board of Arbitration for many
years to deal with produce complaints. As such, any of the members of this threeperson panel may be selected. Of the sixteen individuals approved to mediate and
arbitrate disputes, five are from Canada, ten are from the United States and one is
from Mexico.
105. See CAMCA Rules, art. 7.2.
106. See id.
107. See Rules, art. 23.1.
108. See CAMCA Rules, art. 14.
109. See id.
110. See id.
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DEVELOPING CASELAW

Due to its ad hoc nature, arbitration is less reliant on the
common law doctrine of precedent. However, many writers now
recognize that arbitrators often refer to previous decisions, and
that precedent does play a similar, if not "softer" role in arbitral
decision-making. For this purpose the FVDRC is compiling a
body of past arbitration decisions and making the decisions
available to its members.'1 1 As decisions accumulate, they will
provide some direction to future disputants such that potential
disputes can be more easily concluded in a declaratory manner.
It is interesting to note that neither the FVDRC Rules nor
the CAMCA Rules have appeal mechanisms. This is not unusual given that arbitration in almost all contexts is meant to be
a final and binding procedure.
Formal appellate arbitral
mechanisms are rare. 1 2 The rules promulgated by the FVDRC
and CAMCA do not contain any provision that could be even
remotely considered a privative clause.1' 3 However, the decisions of the Board of Arbitration under the Produce Licensing
Regulations were subject to judicial review. 1 4 It would appear
that FVDRC decisions may be appealed to the courts, although
the grounds under which they might be so appealed are admittedly limited. 1 5 The International Commercial Arbitration
Act' 6 lists several grounds for overturning an award including
incapacity, lack of notice, lack of jurisdiction and repugnance to
111. As of March 16, 2002, the FVDRC website had posted ten arbitration decisions and a select list of complaints, complete with facts, which had been received
and resolved to date.
112. But see, Rules of Arbitration, International Chamber of Commerce, at
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/rules.asp (January 1, 1998). The
International Chamber of Commerce recognizes the inherent weakness in having a
voluntary mechanism whereby parties may bring a dispute to arbitration. Article 27
of the Rules of Arbitration provides that all arbitration awards are to be reviewed by
the courts. Once review is completed, however, the award is final and binding.
113. See Rules, art. 2.2, 2.3. Articles 2.2 and 2.3 of the Rules require that "any
dispute, controversy or claim ... be resolved exclusively in accordance with the
Rules." It may be that in the future these provisions will contemplate the inclusion
of an appeal mechanism, but, to date, the decision of the arbitrator(s) appears final
in respect of the appeal process. There appears to be recourse for an arbitral decision through judicial review, especially in light of the lack of a strong privative
clause.
114. The Produce Licensing Regulations did not contain a privative clause preventing the courts from reviewing the Board of Arbitration's decisions. Decisions of
the Board of Arbitration could be reviewed by the courts where such review was
sought, e.g., Steve Dart Co. [19741 46 D.L.R. (3d) 745, 747.
115. See Rules, arts. 2.4, 2.5.
116. International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 1.9 (Can.).
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public policy."' The modern trend is to interpret these grounds
narrowly and to uphold arbitral decisions.
G.

ENFORCEMENT

After a settlement is reached through the mediation or arbitral process, the focus shifts to enforcement. The FVDRC Rules
provide three mechanisms for enforcement: expulsion, award
registry with the courts, and a published list of violators. 118 The
award or settlement can be registered in the appropriate court
because Canada, the United States and Mexico are each signatories to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 119 which provides for
the enforcement of arbitral awards through domestic courts as
though they were domestic court awards. 20 In addition, the
perceptions of fellow members and the stigma of default should
encourage compliance with FVDRC decisions.
VII.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE FEASIBILITY OF THE
FVDRC

The FVDRC's mediation and arbitration processes appear
to be fulfilling the needs and expectations for which they were
put in place. During its first two years of existence, 150 files
were opened and 130 were resolved.' 2 ' The average time to
reach a resolution was forty-five days. 122 Only thirteen cases
reached the arbitration stage, and the longest time for settlement among these was 177 days from start to finish. 123
The FVDRC may be useful as a model for other nations and
organizations establishing a dispute resolution program. Glyn
Chancey of Canada's Department of Agriculture has pointed out
117. Id. art. 36.
118. See Rules, art. 2.7.
119. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, Jun. 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, 7 I.L.M. 1046.
120. For instance, Article 11(1) of the Ontario International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 1.9, provides that "lain arbitral award recognized by the
court is enforceable in the same manner as a judgment or order of the court." See
FVDRC Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.fvdrc.com/qa-text-e.htm (last
visited Mar. 12, 2001).
121.

Chairman's Report,
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NEWSLETTER, Jan. 2002, available at http://www.fvdrc.com/main-e.htm (last visited
Mar. 10, 2002).
122. Id.
123. Id.
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the successes the Advisory Committee had in "bringing the parties, both government and industry, to the table and identifying
on a very fundamental level their mutual interests."1 24 He noted
that the interests of Canada, the United States, and Mexico
were better served and protected in the others' markets by the
FVDRC. 125 As a result, "there is a very fundamental political
incentive for the governments and parties to facilitate the process, and for industry to participate."1 26 He further noted that
the FVDRC is a voluntary organization that could, over time,
"establish a standard that could be reflected in national stan127
dards."
Shirley Coffield, a Washington trade lawyer and commentator, has rejected the idea of the FVDRC model as generally applicable to other situations. It is her contention that legitimate
negotiation is a "far better way of achieving accommodations
among different standards, rather that the dispute resolution
128
model, which sometimes comes out a winner or a loser."
In rejecting the use of the dispute resolution model, Coffield
fails to recognize that legitimate negotiation forms the initial
stages of the process. As Chancey notes, each party identifies
its mutual interests on a fundamental level. 129 It is the identification of mutual interests that leads to negotiation progress and
movement toward an ultimate solution to the dispute. It is this
forward momentum that may eventually bring the various parties into a mutually satisfactory resolution. Reflection upon the
stages of the FVDRC process and FVDRC's belief in partycentered dispute resolution, it stands to reason that the process
should remain consistent through the arbitration stage, leading
130
to a reasonable, compromising arbitral decision.
The FVDRC is essentially a voluntary dispute resolution
process with each participant voluntarily working toward
achieving a mutually acceptable resolution. By joining the
FVDRC, parties are placing their proverbial cards on the table.
The parties have equal incentives to complete the FVDRC dis124. Proceedings of the Canada-United States Law Institute Conference: Sovereignty Revisited as Canadaand the United States Enter the 21st Century, Cleveland,
Ohio, April 17-19, 1998, Discussion After the Speeches of Shirley Coffield and James
Mcllroy, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 253, 259.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Pirie, supra, note 65, at 105-6.
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pute resolution process and accept the final result, whether
achieved through negotiation, mediation, or arbitration. Moreover, in the interests of efficiency and cost, the FVDRC model
offers significant advantages. As the interconnectedness of international economies increases, so will the desire to resolve
private disputes. Hopefully, the global marketplace will embrace the FVDRC modal as an effective means of resolving conflict.
VIII.

FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS: THE MEXICAN
WILDCARD

One drawback arising from the voluntary nature of the
FVDRC is its inability to make Mexican inroads. From the beginning of NAFTA discussions, Mexico's interest in a process for
agricultural product dispute resolution was relatively lukewarm.1 31 Mexico's Secretary of Commerce and Trade who was
involved in the negotiations surrounding NAFTA Article 707,
not the Mexican Secretary of Agriculture. 132 When the Advisory
Committee on Private Commercial Disputes Regarding Agriculture met, the Mexican government sent representatives from
the agricultural sector as a whole, with no specific focus on perishable produce. 133 Mexican membership in the FVDRC is negligible, with only ten FVDRC members based in Mexico. 134 The
FVDRC considered forgoing further efforts to expand into Mexico in 2000.135 However, the corporation decided that "[t]o forgo

any further efforts at [that] time risk[ed] a loss of credibility for
undermine the
the Corporation as a trinational entity, and could
1 36
industry."
Mexican
the
integrating
of
objective
Recent elections installed a new party in the Mexican presidency for the first time in more than seventy years.' 37 Mexico's
131. Telephone Interview with Stephen Whitney, President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Fruit and Vegetable Dispute Resolution Corporation, (Apr. 30, 2001).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134.

Membership

Report,
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NEWSLETTER, available at http://www.fvdrc.com/news-jan200l-e.htm (Jan. 2002).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Historic Mexican election sweeps long-ruling PRI party from power, CABLE
NEWS NETWORK, at http://cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/07/03/mexico.elections.04

(last visited Apr. 30, 2001). On July 20, 2000, Vincente Fox of the Partido Accion
National became the president of Mexico. This was the first time in seventy-one
years a party other than the Partido Revolucionario Institutional was given a mandate to govern Mexico.

MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE

308

[Vol 11:285

new Secretary of Agriculture, Javier Usabiaga Arroyo, has
commented positively on the FVDRC. He has acknowledged the
usefulness of the FVDRC. 138 He has also made plain a willing139
ness to work with the FVDRC to move it forward in Mexico.
Mexican industry needs to witness the benefits derived
from membership in the FVDRC before it will believe in and join
any new system. In its newsletter in November 2000, the
FVDRC set out the strategy the Board established for building
its membership in Mexico. "The key elements of the strategy
centered around finding and working with key Mexican industry
representatives from the various sectors of the industry across
Mexico." 140 It is hoped that over time, by focusing on selected
members of the industry, Mexican groups will incrementally develop a trust that allows them to build a viable dispute resolution system.'4 ' Mexico needs to have in place a system that protects Canadian and United States exporters in the event of a
dispute over perishable goods that have been shipped to Mex42

ico.1

IX. CONCLUSION
Since the genesis of the FVDRC, its members have enjoyed
a greater degree of certainty regarding how disputes about
transactions among them would be resolved. Members from all
three countries can rely on the private dispute settlement
mechanism to ensure that any disputes are resolved in a timely
manner.
The emphasis of this Article is the importance of the
FVDRC mechanism. The process is conducive to dispute settlement, and it is the mechanism that provides for input and negotiation from all parties. Only if a dispute reaches an impasse
must an independent arbitrator finally impose a resolution.
This model appears to be effective as a means of resolving disputes in a cost-effective and efficient manner. It avoids the previous governmental constraints and jurisdictional arguments.

138. Mexico Project, FRUIT AND VEGETABLE DISPUTE RESOLUTION NEWSLETTER,
available at httpJ/www.fvdrc.com/news-may200l-e.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2002).
139. Id.
140. Fruit and Vegetable Dispute Resolution Newsletter, MEXICO REPORT, Nov.
2000, vol. 1, No. 2.
141. Id.

142. Telephone Interview with Stephen Whitney, President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Fruit and Vegetable Dispute Resolution Corporation, (Apr. 30, 2001).
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This private commercial process accounts for and reflects the interests of both the individual business person and the wider
community.
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